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BANKRUPTCY -QUALIFIED ERISA PLANS DEEMED EXCLUDABLE
FROM BANKRUPTCY ESTATES. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242
(1992).
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Bankruptcy Code excludes from the debtor's bank-
ruptcy estate property that is "subject to a restriction on transfer
enforceable under 'applicable nonbankruptcy law.' "' However, the
Code is silent as to what applicable nonbankruptcy law is and whether
qualified Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) pension
plans fall within the realm of applicable nonbankruptcy law. Until
recently, the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals were split as
to the meaning of applicable nonbankruptcy law. Recently, the United
States Supreme Court resolved this issue in Patterson v. Shumate
and held that qualified ERISA plans are to be excluded from the
bankruptcy estate. 3
II. FACTS
Joseph B. Shumate, Jr. was president and chairman of the
board of directors of Coleman Furniture Corporation.4 Shumate,
along with approximately 400 other Coleman employees, participated
in the Coleman Furniture Corporation Pension Plan (Plan), a plan
which satisfied all of the requirements necessary under ERISA to
qualify for favorable tax treatment under the Internal Revenue Code,5
including the requirement that benefits are not to be alienable or
assignable. 6 Specifically, Article 16.1 of Coleman's Plan stipulated
that "[e]ach pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under
the plan may not be assigned or alienated. ' 7
Shumate, employed by Coleman for over thirty years, had a
Plan interest of approximately $250,000 when Coleman filed for
bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in 1982.8 The
case was later converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding, and a trustee
1. Bankruptcy and Exceptions to the Antiassignment Rule, PPD ERISA NEws-
LETrER (Pension Publications of Denver, Inc.), No. 92-4 at 1, 1. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(c)(2) (1988).
2. 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992).
3. Id. at 2250.
4. Id. at 2245.
5. Id.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988).
7. 112 S. Ct. at 2245.
8. Id.
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was appointed. 9 Due to personal financial difficulties, Shumate him-
self filed for bankruptcy in 1984,10 and John R. Patterson was named
as trustee."
The bankruptcy trustee for Coleman terminated the Plan and
paid out full distributions to all of the participants with the exception
of Shumate. 2 Patterson then filed an adversary proceeding in the
Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia to obtain
Shumate's portion of the Plan for the benefit of his creditors. 3
Shumate resisted by asking the United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia, which consolidated these actions, to
pay his interest in the Plan directly to him, arguing that the proceeds
from his pension plan were excluded from the bankruptcy estate
because "[a] restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of
the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbank-
ruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title [of the Bankruptcy
Code].' ' 4 The District Court declined to follow Shumate's inter-
pretation of § 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, holding the "ap-
plicable nonbankruptcy law" provision to apply only to state law
and not to federal law. 5 The court found that Shumate's interest
did not qualify as a spendthrift trust under Virginia law and was
thus not excluded from the bankruptcy estate.' 6
The decision of the district court was reversed by the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals.' 7 The court relied on its previous decision
in Anderson v. Raine (In re Moore)" in holding that the ERISA-
qualified pension plan was protected under "applicable nonbank-
ruptcy law," and, therefore, the pension was excluded from the
bankruptcy estate. 9
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 20 because






14. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988).
15. 112 S. Ct. at 2245 (1992) (quoting Creasy v. Coleman Furniture Corp., 83
B.R. 404, 406 (W.D. Va. 1988)).
16. Id. (quoting Creasy v. Coleman Furniture Corp., 83 B.R. 404, 406-09 (W.D.
Va. 1988)).
17. 943 F.2d 362 (4th Cir. 1991).
18. 907 F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990).
19. 943 F.2d at 365.
20. 112 S. Ct. 932 (1992).
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nonbankruptcy law" in § 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. 2' The
Court held that "applicable nonbankruptcy law" clearly applied to
federal as well as state law and that Shumate's pension proceeds
were part of a qualified pension plan under ERISA and, therefore,
excluded from his bankruptcy estate. 22 Patterson v. Shumate, 112
S. Ct. 2242 (1992).
III. HISTORIcAL DEVELOPMENT
Congress enacted § 541 of the Bankruptcy Code with the in-
tention that its uniformity and thorough scope would allow creditors
to reach more of the debtor's property and, at the same time,
provide the debtor with the possibility of a "fresh start" albeit not
a "head start.'' 23 What Congress did not anticipate was the confusion
that would develop from the different interpretations of the exclusion
clause found in § 541(c)(2). Before the Supreme Court construed
the meaning of "applicable nonbankruptcy law," there were three
different interpretations of the clause.
A. "Applicable Nonbankruptcy Law": Not Including Federal
Law
The earliest and most prominent case to hold that applicable
nonbankruptcy law did not include federal law is the Fifth Circuit
case of Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff). The assets sought to be
protected in Goff were the debtors' self-employed retirement plans,
or Keogh plans.75 These plans expressly provided that "[n]either the
assets nor the benefits provided hereunder shall be subject to alienation,
anticipation, assignment, garnishment, attachment, execution, or levy
of any kind." '26
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to exclude the plans
from the bankruptcy estate, holding that its "examination of the
Bankruptcy Code's provisions and of discernible congressional intent
21. 112 S. Ct. at 2246.
22. Id. at 2246-48.
23. Robert Hutchison, Comment, ERISA and Bankruptcy: Can Creditors Reach
a Chapter 7 Debtor's Pension?, 61 Miss. L.J. 389, 392 (1991). See also Geoffrey
Orlandi, Recent Development, Property of the Estate: Section 541, 3 BANKR. DEv.
J. 341, 342-43 (1986).
24. 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983). See William C. Byrd II, Note, To Exclude
or Not to Exclude: The Dilemma of ERISA Pension Plans in the Realm of
Bankruptcy, 15 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 343, 353-60 (1991); Hutchison, supra note
23, at 394-99; Marvin Krasny & Bruce Grohsgal, Whose Pension is it Anyway?-
ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code, 97 COM. L.J. 12, 14-19 (1992).
25. 706 F.2d at 576.
26. Id. at 577.
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reveals that applicable nonbankruptcy law was intended as a narrow
reference to state 'spendthrift trust' law and not as a broad reference
to all other law, both federal and state, including ERISA." 27 The
court looked to the legislative history found in House and Senate
Reports discussing § 541(c)(2) to support its decision. 28 The House
Report stated that "[p]aragraph (2) of subsection (c) ...preserves
restrictions on transfer of a spendthrift trust to the extent that the
restriction is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law."
29
The Senate Report stated that "[plaragraph (2) of subsection (c)
... preserves restrictions on a transfer of a spendthrift trust ...
[since] ... the restriction is enforceable nonbankruptcy law to the
extent of the income reasonably necessary for the support of a debtor
and his dependents." 30 The court also relied on a Supreme Court
decision under prior bankruptcy law which held that where property
"is sufficiently rooted in pre-bankruptcy past and so little entangled
with the bankrupts' ability to make an unencumbered fresh start
it should be regarded as 'property' [of the estate]."'"
Goff has been criticized for its review of legislative history
because of the generally accepted principle of statutory construction
that legislative history of a statute is not examined when the statute
reviewed is clear.32 Further, critics argued legislative history did not
support the conclusion that Congress intended to limit the § 541(c)(2)
exclusion to spendthrift trusts." Others have argued that by interpreting
the exclusion in this manner, the policy goal of ERISA is undermined
because the debtor is left with "virtually no means with which to
provide for himself and his family after he retires."
3 4
Less than one year after Goff, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals held in Samore v. Graham (In re Graham)35 that "[t]here
[was] no indication whatever that Congress intended § 541(c)(2) to
be a broad exclusion which would apply to keep all debtors' entire
ERISA plan benefits out of the estate." 36 in determining this
27. Id. The Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Goff in Heitkamp v. Dyke
(In re Dyke), 943 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1991).
28. 706 F.2d at 581-86. See Byrd, supra note 24, at 353-56.
29. Byrd, supra note 24, at 354 (citing H.R. REP. No. 95, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
369 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6325); see also Goff, 706 F.2d
at 581.
30. Byrd, supra note 24, at 354 (citing S. REP. No. 95, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
83 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6136); see also Goff, 706 F.2d
at 582.
31. 706 F.2d at 578 (quoting Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380 (1966)).
32. Krasny & Grohsgal, supra note 24, at 15.
33. Krasny & Grohsgal, supra note 24, at 16.
34. Byrd, supra note 24, at 363-64.
35. 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984).
36. Id. at 1272.
[Vol. 15:753
BANKRUPTCY
Congressional intent, the Graham court also looked to the legislative
history of § 541(c)(2) after determining that the statute was not clear
on its face." Another factor the court considered in finding that
§ 541(c)(2) did not apply was that § 522(b)(1) explicitly allows an
individual debtor to exempt property specified under § 522(d), which
includes pension benefits, among other alternatives.3" Pension benefits,
if not chosen, would not be exempt, clearly showing an intention
to normally include pension benefits as part of the bankruptcy
estate.3 9
Over the following several years, other circuit courts followed
Goff.40 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted this reasoning
in Daniel v. Security Pacific National Bank (In re Daniel)41 and
stated that the "Goff case makes it clear that Congress never intended
for the ERISA and IRC anti-alienation provisions to create exemptions
or exclusions for pension plans under . . . the nonbankruptcy
exclusions of 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2)." 42 The Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals followed these courts' reasoning in Lichstrahl v. Bankers
Trust (In re Lichstrahl)3 and held that because the pension plans
37. Id. at 1271-72. See also Comment, The Fate of ERISA-Qualified Pension
Plans Under the Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 Wm. MrrcHELL L. REv. 1045, 1061-
62 (1985).
38. 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(b)(1) and 522(d) (1988).
39. 726 F.2d at 1272.
40. Krasny & Grohsgal, supra note 24, at 19-20.
41. 771 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985).
42. Id. at 1359. See also Krasny & Grohsgal, supra note 24, at 19-20. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed the Daniel ruling in Pitrat v. Garlikov,
947 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1991). The Pitrat court cited Daniel, saying, "[T]he phrase
'applicable non-bankruptcy law' . . . was intended to be a narrow reference to
state 'spendthrift trust' law and not a broad reference to all other laws, including
ERISA and IRC, which prohibit alienation." 947 F.2d at 422.
43. 750 F.2d 1488 (lth Cir. 1985). The court held that " 'applicable non-
bankruptcy law' refers only to state spendthrift trust law. Therefore, ERISA-
qualifying pension plans containing anti-alienation provisions are excluded pursuant
to section 541(c)(2) only if they are enforceable under state law as spendthrift
trusts." Id. at 1490. The court determined that the pension plans were not spendthrift
trusts under Florida law because the person who was the beneficiary was also the
trustee of the pension plans and as such he enjoyed "absolute dominion" over
the trust property. Id. Since the plans were not spendthrift trusts, they were not
excluded from the bankrupt estate by § 541(c)(2). Id. Critics of the Lichstrahl case
argue that by definition, qualified ERISA plans satisfy the requirement of a restraint
on the transferability of the beneficiary's interest. Nancy R. Menzel, Note, Corporate
Pension Plans as Property of the Bankruptcy Estate, 69 MiN. L. REv. 1113, 1124
(1985). Nevertheless, the court in Lichstrahl pierced the corporate veil of the debtor
and held that the trust could not be a spendthrift trust because of the reservation
by the settlor-debtor of the power to amend or terminate the trust through the
corporation, which in the court's mind gave the settlor-debtor "absolute dominion."
750 F.2d at 1490. See also Menzel, supra at 1124.
1993]
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were not spendthrift trusts, they were not to be excluded from the
bankruptcy estate under § 541(c)(2). 44
B. "Applicable Nonbankruptcy Law": Including Federal Law
The leading case holding that applicable nonbankruptcy law
does include federal law is In re Moore.45 The debtors in this case
were all employees of Springs Industries who participated in the
company's extensive retirement plan. 46 The plan contained anti-
assignment restrictions. 47 The court rejected the "overly restrictive
interpretation" that § 541(c)(2) only applied to state spendthrift trust
law, 48 and maintained that the narrow interpretation demanded by
the bankruptcy trustee simply was not the interpretation required
by the statute's "broad language." ' 49 The court found that "[niothing
in the phrase 'applicable nonbankruptcy law' . . . suggests that the
phrase refers exclusively to state law, much less to state spendthrift
trust law," ' 50 and pointed out that it was "incongruous to give the
same phrase in § 541(c)(2) ["applicable nonbankruptcy law"] a
narrower construction than the identical phrase in other parts of
the Bankruptcy Code, particularly since the disparate sections of the
Bankruptcy Code were enacted together in a single comprehensive
statute." 5'
The Moore court declined to consider legislative history, 52 calling
it "irrelevant" and "inconclusive." ' 5 The court stated that it was
improper to examine the legislative history because the language was
clear,5 4 and "[lI]egislative history is irrelevant to the interpretation
of an unambiguous statute.""
Finally, the court held that ERISA constituted applicable
nonbankruptcy law because it unquestionably prevented general
44. 750 F.2d at 1490.
45. 907 F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990). See Byrd, supra note 24, at 360-63; George
L. Flint, Jr., ERISA: Anti-Alienation Superiority in Bankruptcy, 94 W. VA. L.
REv. 411, 475-76 (1991); Krasny & Grohsgal, supra note 24, at 20-22; Richard
Rollings, Jr., Note, A Debtor's Interest in ERISA Funds as Property of the Estate:
A Question of Statutory Interpretation, 56 Mo. L. REv. 787 (1991).
46. 907 F.2d at 1476-77.




51. Id. at 1478. See also Flint, supra note 45, at 475.
52. 907 F.2d at 1478.
53. Id. See also Flint, supra note 45, at 475.
54. 907 F.2d at 1478.
55. Id. at 1478-79 (quoting Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 109 S. Ct.
1500, 1504 n.3 (1989)).
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creditors from obtaining an interest in a debtor's ERISA-qualified
trust.56 The court also said that this conclusion advanced ERISA's
purpose of securing uniform pension benefit treatment throughout
the country. 5
The Moore holding soon had much influence over decisions in
other circuits.18 The Sixth Circuit followed the Moore decision in
Forbes v. Lucas (In re Lucas).19 The Lucas court said that "[ilt is
an axiom of statutory construction that resort to legislative history
is improper when a statute is unambiguous" 60 and declared the
language of § 541(c)(2) to be unambiguous. 6' The court found
consistency between the "plain language of the statute" and the
inclusion of ERISA within the definition of "applicable nonbankruptcy
law." 62
The Third Circuit in Velis v. Kardanis63 and the Tenth Circuit
in Gladwell v. Harline (In re Harline)64 .both followed the holding
in Moore that "the plain meaning of § 541(c)(2) excluded from the
estate the debtor's interest in an ERISA-qualified pension plan.' '65
In Velis, the court found that "the term 'enforceable under applicable
nonbankruptcy law' is not in the least ambiguous, and cannot
reasonably be interpreted as 'enforceable under applicable state
spendthrift-trust law.' "66 The court included the debtor's IRA in
the bankruptcy estate, however, because, although it had an anti-
alienation clause, the debtor could withdraw the funds without penalty.
Therefore, there were no "enforceable" restrictions on transferring
the interest in the account. 67 As for the debtor's pension plan and
Keogh plan, the court concluded that "to the extent the assets in
these plans have already been distributed to or for the benefit of
the debtor, the debtor no longer has available the protections which
might otherwise have been accorded under the ERISA statute."68
The court reasoned that when the money was taken out of the plans
for the debtor's own purposes, the debtor had unrestricted possession
56. Id. at 1479.
57. Id. at 1480.
58. Krasny & Grohsgal, supra note 24, at 21-22; Rollings, supra note 45, at
797-99.
59. 924 F.2d 597 (6th Cir. 1991).
60. Id. at 600. See also Rollings, supra note 45, at 797.
61. 924 F.2d at 601. See also Rollings, supra note 45, at 797.
62. 924 F.2d at 601-02. See also Rollings, supra note 45, at 797.
63. 949 F.2d 78 (3rd Cir. 1991).
64. 950 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1991).
65. Krasny & Grohsgal, supra note 24, at 22.
66. 949 F.2d at 81.
67. Id. at 82. See also Krasny & Grohsgal, supra note 24, at 22.
68. 949 F.2d at 82.
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of the pension funds, and they were no longer considered to be
pension assets but were part of the estate. 69 The undistributed funds
in the pension plan and the Keogh plan, on the other hand, were
deemed to be excludable under § 541(c)(2).70
The Harline court followed the reasoning of the Third, Fourth,
and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals and concluded that a "tax-
qualified ERISA pension or profit sharing plan is exempt from the
bankruptcy estate under § 541(c)(2). ' ' 71 Although remanded for lack
of a sufficient record upon which to determine whether the plan
qualified, the Tenth Circuit held that if the plan was ERISA-qualified
and the debtor had not retired or ceased employment with the
employer-sponsor, then his interest in the plan would be excluded
from his bankruptcy estate by § 541(c)(2). 72
C. ERISA-Qualified Plans Are State Spendthrift Trusts
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Patterson v. Shumate,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the district courts of the
Second Circuit held that "ERISA-qualified pension plans constitute
state spendthrift trusts, at least in part. ' 73 In In re Tisdale,74 the
court rejected the argument that § 541(c)(2) excluded all ERISA-
qualified pension plans from the bankruptcy estate7 5 but resolved
that under Connecticut law the part of the debtor's plan that was
funded by the employer contained anti-alienation restrictions. 76 The
court then found that the pension plan constituted a spendthrift
trust and was exempt to the extent of the employer's contributions. 77
The same result was reached applying New York law in In re
Kleist 78 and Indiana law in In re LeFeber.79 In Kleist, a New York
statute allowed qualified ERISA plans to be "conclusively presumed
to be spendthrift trusts under [the statute] and the common law of
the state of New York for all purposes, including ... all cases
arising under or related to a case arising under" the Bankruptcy
69. Id. See also Krasny & Grohsgal, supra note 24, at 22.
70. 949 F.2d at 83. See also Krasny & Grohsgal, supra note 24, at 22.
71. 950 F.2d at 674. See also Krasny & Grohsgal, supra note 24, at 22.
72. 950 F.2d at 676.
73. In re LeFeber, 906 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Tisdale, 112 B.R. 61
(D. Conn. 1990); In re Kleist, 114 B.R. 366 (N.D.N.Y. 1990). See also Krasny &
Grohsgal, supra note 24, at 23.
74. 112 B.R. 61 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990).
75. Id. at 64.
76. Id. at 66.
77. Id.
78. 114 B.R. 366 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1990).
79. 906 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1990).
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Code.80 The court noted that the state would be given deference in
creating the boundaries of the definition of spendthrift trusts, thus
allowing a state to put property over which the debtor has control
within the protection of spendthrift trust boundaries.8'
In LeFeber, an Indiana statute included ERISA-qualified pension
plans as spendthrift trusts, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that the statute was "applicable nonbankruptcy law" under
§ 541(c)(2) and excluded the pension assets from the bankruptcy
estate.82 The court held, "In our opinion, the restriction preventing
an irrevocable assignment would be enforceable under Indiana law,
and therefore § 541(c)(2) makes the same restriction enforceable in
bankruptcy.''83
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT IN SHUMATE
In Patterson v. Shumate,84 the United States Supreme Court
resolved the question of whether qualified pension plans are to be
included in the bankruptcy estate. The Court's decision to exclude
the qualified pension benefits was principally based upon the "plain
language of the Bankruptcy Code and ERISA. ' s5 The Code provides
that "[a] restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the
debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy
law is enforceable in a case under this title."8s6 The Court found
that there was nothing in the statute which limited the application
of "applicable nonbankruptcy law" to state law.8 7 Justice Blackmun,
writing for the Court, concluded:
The Code reveals, significantly, that Congress, when it desired
to do so, knew how to restrict the scope of applicable law to
'state law' and did so with some frequency. ... Congress' decision
to use the broader phrase 'applicable nonbankruptcy law' in
§ 541(c)(2) strongly suggests that it did not intend to restrict the
provision in the manner that petitioner contends. 88
The Court held that, when plainly read, there was nothing in the
statute to limit applicable nonbankruptcy law to state law, and,
80. 114 B.R. at 368-69. See also Krasny & Grohsgal, supra note 24, at 23.
81. 114 B.R. at 369-70. See also Krasny & Grohsgal, supra note 24, at 23.
82. 906 F.2d at 331. See also Krasny & Grohsgal, supra note 24, at 23.
83. 906 F.2d at 331.
84. 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992).
85. Id. at 2246.
86. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988).
87. 112 S. Ct. at 2246.
88. Id. at 2246-47. Justice Blackmun also pointed out that the phrase "applicable
nonbankruptcy law" was used in the other sections of the Bankruptcy Code and
had been interpreted by courts to include federal law. Id. at 2247 n.2.
19931
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therefore, federal law such as ERISA was included under § 541(c)(2).19
Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, observed that "[w]hen the
phrase 'applicable nonbankruptcy law' is considered in isolation, the
phenomenon that three Courts of Appeals could have thought it a
synonym for 'state law' is mystifying."0
After concluding that applicable nonbankruptcy law was not
confined to state law, the Court turned to the anti-alienation clause
in Coleman's Plan to determine if it satisfied the terms of § 541(c)(2). 91
The Court looked at § 206(d)(1) of ERISA, 92 which states that "[ejach
pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan
may not be assigned or alienated." 93 The Court also looked at the
correlative section of the Internal Revenue Code. 94 This section states
that "[a] trust shall not constitute a qualified trust under this section
unless the plan of which such trust is a part provides that benefits
provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated." 95 The
Court concluded that both sections unquestionably dictated a "re-
striction on the transfer" of a debtor's "beneficial interest" in the
trust and that Coleman Furniture's Plan complied with these re-
quirements. 96 Because ERISA is considered applicable nonbankruptcy
law and because Coleman's pension plan contained the proper anti-
alienation clause to be a qualified plan under ERISA, the Supreme
Court held that there was an enforceable transfer restriction and
that Shumate's pension proceeds were excluded from his bankruptcy
estate .97
The Court addressed Patterson's arguments against this reading
of the Code. First, he asserted that the Court should have looked
at relevant legislative materials that established that exclusion from
the bankruptcy estate did not include the debtor's interest in a
qualified ERISA pension plan under § 541(c)(2). 98 The Court re-
sponded that even if it had considered the legislative history of
§ 541(c)(2), there was nothing in this material that would have
changed the outcome of the decision because there was "no clearly
expressed legislative intention contrary to the result reached above." 99
89. Id. at 2247.
90. Id. at 2250 (Scalia, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 2247.
92. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988).
93. 112 S. Ct. at 2247 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988)).
94. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13) (1988).
95. 112 S. Ct. at 2247 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13)).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2246-48.
98. Id. at 2248.
99. Id. The legislative material referred to by the petitioner was from the House
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Second, Patterson claimed that by allowing a debtor to exclude
his ERISA-qualified pension plan interest under § 541(c)(2), the Court
rendered § 522(d)(10)(E),100 the exemption section, useless.',' This
section allows a debtor who chooses the federal exemptions to exempt
his right to secure "a payment under a stock bonus, pension,
profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract ... to the extent
reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent
of the debtor." 10 2 Patterson argued that if the entire pension plan
interest could be excluded then there would be no reason for a
limited exemption for it elsewhere. 0 3 The Court rejected this ar-
gument on the ground that "§ 522(d)(10)(E) exempts from the bank-
ruptcy estate a much broader category than § 541(c)(2) excludes."' 4
Justice Blackmun maintained that "[o]nce [the] petitioner concedes
that § 522(d)(10)(E)'s exemption applies to more than ERISA-qual-
ified plans containing anti-alienation provisions, his argument that
our reading of § 541(c)(2) renders the exemption provision super-
fluous must collapse."' 0 5
Finally, Patterson asserted that the Court's holding thwarted
the policy of the Bankruptcy Code to guarantee an extensive inclusion
of the debtor's assets in the bankruptcy estate.? 6 He claimed that
Congress expansively defined property of the bankruptcy estate by
declaring that it included "all legal and equitable interests of the
debtor in property as of the commencement of the case."' 0 7 One
narrow exception exists for assets where there is a "restriction on
the transfer of the debtor's interest in a trust that is enforceable
and Senate Reports for the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. These reports spoke
of allowing spendthrift trusts to fall under the protection of applicable nonbank-
ruptcy law and in the petitioner's opinion that limited § 541(c)(2) to spendthrift
trusts. Id. The House Report states: "Paragraph (2) of subsection (c) . . .preserves
restrictions on transfer of a spendthrift trust to the extent that the restriction is
enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law." Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-
595, at 369 (1977)). The Senate Report states that section 541(c)(2) "preserves
restrictions on a transfer of a spendthrift trust." Id. (citing S. REP. No. 95-989,
at 83 (1978)).
100. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1988).
101. 112 S. Ct. at 2248-49.
102. Id. at 2249 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1988)).
103. Id.
104. Id. Justice Blackmun described pension plans that could be exempted from
the bankruptcy estate under § 522(d)(10)(E) but would not qualify under § 541(c)(2)
because they lacked an anti-alienation clause. Some examples include individual




107. Id. at 2249 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988)). See also Hutchison, supra
note 23, at 389-90.
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under applicable nonbankruptcy law."' 18 The Court rejected this
assertion for several reasons. First, the Court suggested that the
petitioner mistook the expansive definition of includable property
to mean that it was an underlying "policy" of the complete Code.' °9
In rejecting this argument, the Court said that "to the extent that
policy considerations are even relevant where the language of the
statute is so clear, we believe that our construction of § 541(c)(2)
[including ERISA as applicable nonbankruptcy law] is preferable to
the one petitioner urges upon us. ' " °1
Secondly, the Court reasoned that its decision ensured the uni-
form treatment of pension benefits regardless of the beneficiary's
financial status."' The Court stated that it had refused any exceptions
to ERISA's anti-alienation clause outside of the bankruptcy context
in previous cases." 2 This approach was taken in order to decrease
the attempts of creditors to manipulate the bankruptcy laws in order
to attain access to funds not available under other conditions." 3
Next, the Court found that its ruling gave ERISA's goal of
pension benefit protection full force and effect." 4 This goal guar-
antees that "if a worker has been promised a defined pension benefit
upon retirement-and if he has fulfilled whatever conditions are
required to obtain a vested benefit-he actually will receive it."' 5
Lastly, the Court stated that the holding in Shumate promoted
uniformity in the treatment of pension benefits nationwide." 6 Shu-
mate insured that the benefits from pension plans would be governed
under the federal law of ERISA instead of being left to the in-
dependent interpretations of state spendthrift trust law." 7 Because
there is only one governing authority, pension plan regulation is
more uniform, and the beneficiaries of the plan are given more
protection and better security."" If the Goff and Lichstrahl state
spendthrift trust tests were used to determine whether a qualified
pension plan would be excluded or included in the bankruptcy estate,
108. Hutchison, supra note 23, at 390.
109. 112 S. Ct. at 2249.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2250. See Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Pension Fund, 493 U.S.
365 (1990).
113. 112 S. Ct. at 2250.
114. Id.
115. Id. (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S.
359, 375 (1980)). See also Hutchison, supra note 23, at 391.
116. 112 S. Ct. at 2250 (citing Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S.
1, 9 (1987)).
117. Id.
118. Byrd, supra note 24, at 351.
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the results would vary in different states due to the differing treatment
of the debtor's plan under separate state laws."19
V. SIGNIFICANCE OF PATTERSON V. SHUMATE
Patterson v. Shumate had an immediate impact on bankruptcy
law. A mere nine days after the decision, the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals remanded Wear v. Greene (In re Greene)120 to the bank-
ruptcy court to be considered in the light of Shumate because its
prior decision in Samore v. Graham (In re Graham)2' no longer
constituted valid law. Other cases, such as In re Jones'22 and In re
Iannacone,23 have also been remanded in light of Shumate. In
Massachusetts, the district court issued memorandums in In re Sirois'2 4
and In re Gre]' 25 holding that if the pension plans in question were
deemed qualified under ERISA, then they would be excluded from
the bankruptcy estate due to the holding in Shumate.
Patterson v. Shumate has far reaching benefits for debtors in
bankruptcy. It will allow qualified pension plans to be protected
for the debtor's benefit, and the debtor will receive what he has
been promised from the pension plan. It will also, as the Court
recognized, provide a uniform procedure for treatment of qualified
pension plans. 126
However, Shumate does not answer the question of the avail-
ability of qualified pension funds as assets of the bankruptcy estate
once the employee begins to receive distributions of the corpus from
the pension plan. Section 522(d)(10)(E) allows an exemption for "a
payment under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity ...
to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor
and any dependent of the debtor,' 1 27 but this is an issue that will
need to be decided on a case by case basis.
From the creditor's point-of-view, the ruling provides another
barrier to access to the debtor's assets. Qualified pension plans will
be another safe harbor for the debtor in bankruptcy. The money,
once placed in a qualified pension plan, will not be taken to pay
the debts of a bankrupt debtor. The creditor will more than likely
119. Menzel, supra note 43, at 1126.
120. 967 F.2d 1216 (8th Cir. 1992).
121. 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984).
122. 142 B.R. 950 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1992).
123. 974 F.2d 88 (8th Cir. 1992).
124. 144 B.R. 12 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992).
125. 144 B.R. 206 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992).
126. 112 S. Ct. at 2249.
127. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1988).
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view Shumate as a way for the debtor to circumvent the debt owed
to the creditor.
B. Shay Wilson
